proportion of peers would lie. In addition, the senders in these low benefit control sessions lie significantly less,
compared to their counterparts in high benefit control sessions.
In the first type of treatment sessions, we hold the benefit at a low level, and simultaneously provide the senders
with norm related information from the high benefit control sessions. The goal of such information provision is
to shift the treatment senders’ belief about peer lying upward. We observe that these treatment senders indeed
change their belief as expected. In addition, they lie significantly more, compared to the senders in the low
benefit control sessions. As such, the intervention to shift perceived norm of lying upward is able to thwart the
effect of a lowering of benefit from lying.
The second type of treatment sessions are analogous to the first type. In the second type, we hold the benefit at a
high level, and simultaneously provide the senders with norm related information from the low benefit control
sessions. The goal of such information provision is to shift the senders’ belief about peer lying downward. We
observe that these senders lower their belief but they do not significantly lower the level of lying, compared to
the senders in the high benefit control sessions. Thus, the intervention that shifts perceived norm downward does
not quite succeed in mitigating the effect of an increased benefit from lying. Overall, we observe that subjects
incorporate a descriptive norm in their preferences for lying in a self-serving manner: they act on their belief
about peer lying behavior more when it is beneficial to do so.
The information provided to the senders in the treatment sessions discussed above is “complete” in the sense that
it includes two pieces: (i) payoff structure in a prior control session, and (ii) proportion of lying in the same
control session. We conduct additional treatment sessions to examine the effect of a “partial” version of the
information. The partial version includes information on lying from prior control sessions but excludes any
information on the control sessions’ payoffs. The purpose of these partial sessions is to develop further insight

into senders’ preferences, with a view to tracing out the exact piece of information from prior sessions that
influences a current sender’s decision to lie. The results indicate that the effects of partial information provision

are not significantly different from that of complete information provision. We also conduct an additional
treatment to assess whether our intervention design generates any experimenter demand effects. We find no
evidence for such effects.
Our results contribute to the extant literature, and also point to some policy implications. They indicate that a law
and order policy aimed at curbing dishonest behavior (such as lying) via reducing pecuniary incentives for
dishonesty may not be sufficient when a society or an organization operates under the norm of a high level of
dishonesty. We believe our results may provide an indirect micro-level behavioral explanation for why the level
of corruption (another form of dishonest behavior) in countries plagued by corruption problems has not shown
sensitivity to improvement in the law and order situation in those countries. 4 ,

5 Our

results highlight the

importance of the long established social norms of corruption in these countries, among other factors, for the
persistence of corruption, even when the potential gains from corruption may have gone down due to
improvements in law and order situations.
On the other hand, our results also suggest that in a society in which honesty is the perceived norm and the level
of dishonesty is low, the policymakers may not ease up on the measures to curb dishonest behavior, with the
hope that the culture of honesty will be self-sustaining. These ideas also point to the significance of tipping the
society in one direction or the other, for a fresh start in terms of economic, political or sociological regimes.

2 Literature review

Our work relates to two intertwined and broad strands of literature: lying and effects of norm on lying; and
effects of norm on tax compliance and other strategic/non-strategic decisions. In what follows, we mention some
notable works from each strand. 6
The seminal work of Gneezy (2005) reports that people exhibit an aversion to lie, and that lying comes at a
moral cost. Other studies show that lying aversion varies across individuals (Hurkens & Kartik, 2009; Gibson,
Tanner, & Wagner, 2013) and that the decision to lie is sensitive to a variety of factors, such as, monetary
consequences (Freeman & Gelber, 2010; Bucciol, Landini, & Piovesan, 2013; Gibson et al., 2013), payoff
uncertainty for the party lied to (Dugar, Mitra, & Shahriar, 2019), relative strength of incentives and intrinsic cost
(Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017), strategic considerations (Sutter, 2009), guilt aversion (Charness & Dufwenberg,
2010; Battigalli, Charness, & Dufwenberg, 2013), gender (Dreber & Johannesson, 2008), the extent of lie (
Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe, & Johannesson, 2009; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013), cooperation in prior
play (Ellingsen, Johannesson, Lilja, & Zetterqvist, 2009), prior unfair treatment (Houser, Vetter, & Winter, 2012),
and the nature of group (fixed versus endogenous) that induces different reporting practices (Reuben &
Stephenson, 2013). 7
Several prominent studies focus on norms and unethicality, in the form of lying, dishonesty, and corruption.
Specifically, these studies focus on how various norms shape (un)ethicality in strategic environments. Gino,
Ayal, and Ariely (2009) discuss how individual unethicality depends on the saliency of dishonesty, as well as on
others’ dishonesty as a social norm. Pruckner and Sausgruber (2013) report a field experiment which evinces that
a moral reminder increases the level of honesty, whereas, a reminder of the legal norm has no effect. The authors
argue that the results are consistent with preferences for honesty, shaped by an internalized social norm. Innes
and Mitra (2013) report results from a laboratory experiment in which the monetary consequences of lying are
held fixed, but cues on how often others lie (is simulated to) vary. Their results indicate that dishonesty is
significantly contagious, but honesty is mostly not. Rauhut (2013) shows bi-directional effects of information
about others’ lying: such information can restore norm adherence and also can exacerbate normative decay.
Fosgaard, Hansen, and Piovesan (2013) disentangle whether contagion in cheating originates from norm
conformity or from awareness that cheating is an option to consider, and show that men cheat more under
conformity, whereas, women cheat with a greater probability when awareness of cheating as an option increases.
Galeotti, Kline, and Orsini (2017) show violations of a distributive justice norm promote more dishonesty,
regardless of whether dishonesty has consequences for income redistribution. Diekmann, Przepiorka, and
Rauhut (2015) employ a die throwing experiment and show that though lying increases with the knowledge of
other liars (contagion), beliefs about the prevalence of norm violations mitigate the effect of such knowledge.
Soraperra et al. (2017) focus on how collaboration in task and norm exposure impact dishonesty, and they show
that collaboration induces more dishonesty than exposure. Dimant (2019) shows that anti-social behavior
(decision to increase own payoff by reducing a charity’s payoff) is more contagious than pro-social behavior, and
that social proximity shapes the contagion of anti-social behavior with greater intensity than the contagion of prosocial behavior.
Our paper contributes to the above literature in several ways. We demonstrate how an unethical act (namely,
lying) is governed by the interplay between norm and benefit. We also demonstrate that a decision maker’s
exposure to norms, even when such norms originate from different payoff structures, guides him/her in a selfserving manner. Moreover, we carefully trace out the otherwise latent role of belief, i.e., how a change in benefit
from lying changes an individual’s perceived norm (belief regarding peer lying) even when norm is not directly

intervened; and how a change in norms changes an individual’s belief in the same direction, undercutting the

impact of a change in benefit in the opposite direction. As such, we document that sensitivity of lying to
monetary consequences that the literature has established can partly be explained by uncontrolled changes in
perceived norms.
We begin our discussion on the second strand of literature by highlighting some norm-related factors that shape
the decisions to engage in corruption. Researchers focus on social appropriateness of norm violation vis-a-vis
corruption (Banerjee, 2016), effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms (
Abbink, Freidin, Gangadharan, & Moro, 2018), impact of social observability of corruption (Salmon & Serra,
2017), relative effectiveness of monetary and nonmonetary costs of corruption (Banerjee & Mitra, 2018), and
impact of moral cost (induced by framing) on corruptive behavior (Banerjee, 2015).
Several authors document the important roles norms play in shaping individual behavior with regard to tax
compliance. Wenzel (2004) shows, using data from a survey, that Australian taxpayers internalize the social
norms and act accordingly, provided they identify themselves with the norm attributing reference group. In two
subsequent papers, Wenzel (2005a, 2005b) argues that for individuals who identify with a group, perceived
social norms and tax compliance behavior endogenously impact each other. On the other hand, individuals’ selfother discrepancy that originates from a misperception that others’ acceptance of tax evasion being greater than
one’s own undermines own tax compliance. He conducts a field experiment with Australian taxpayers and
demonstrates that a feedback mechanism on the misperception helps reduce tax deduction claims.
Bobek, Roberts, and Sweeney (2007) show that the most influential social norm construct that explains tax
compliance is taxpayers’ own moral beliefs, and the beliefs of those close to them. The second important social
norm construct is societal views of proper behavior. Fortin, Lacroix, and Villeval (2007) develop and
experimentally test a model of tax evasion that incorporates endogenous interactions (i.e., social conformity
effects), exogenous interactions (i.e., fairness effects), and correlated effects. The results trace out the role of
fairness effects but reject social conformity. Traxler (2010) highlights that belief management can emerge as an
effective policy tool in a heterogeneous society, where norm compliance (regarding tax payment) depends on
morale reference groups.
Bobek, Hageman, and Kelliher (2013) show that individuals’ tax compliance decisions are directly influenced by
personal norms and subjective norms, whereas, such decisions are indirectly influenced by injunctive norms and
descriptive norms. Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl, and Villeval (2015) report results from an experiment on tax
compliance behavior. In two of their treatments, subjects receive information from past experimental sessions on
highest (lowest) tax evasion rates. The results indicate that such information has an asymmetric effect: high (low)
compliance does not (does) substantially lower (raise) tax evasion for certain probabilities.
Social norm, social influence, and peer effects have been extensively studied in various other contexts, such as
the dictator game and the public goods game. Studies in dictator game, for instance, demonstrate that fairness in
allocation as a norm is contagious (Bichchieri and Xiao, 2009; Krupka & Weber, 2009; Cason & Mui, 1998;
Duffy & Kornienko, 2010). Studies in experimental public goods games indicate that establishment of a norm
for contributions (by virtue of enforcements, social approval, punishment etc.) improves the level of individual
contributions to the public good (Reuben & Riedl, 2013; Rege, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2000).
Our paper differs from the works on corruption and tax compliance discussed above. In our setting, a sender
may incur a moral cost while engaging in an unethical act (lying), but aside from that, his/her action does not
face any potential enforcements, sanctions, or rejections from any other party, which represent the typical settings
the papers on corruption and tax compliance employ. Our context also differs from those in dictator games and

public goods games in that it involves the possibility of deliberate misrepresentation of a fact concerning payoffs.
In a dictator game or public goods game, a decision maker may exhibit preferences for selfishness, which is
different from preferences for lying that we try to capture (see Innes & Mitra, 2013).
Overall, the novelty of our study resides in its focus on the interaction of simultaneous changes in the pecuniary
incentives of an unethical act and a descriptive norm regarding the act. As indicated earlier, our study also traces
out a possible micro level behavioral trait that can partly explain the emergence of a stricter regime of law and
order juxtaposed with worsened corruption problem in many countries.

3 Experimental design & hypotheses
3.1 The games
Table 1 shows a generic deception game. The game is played between two players: a sender and a receiver. The
sender recommends to the receiver one of two possible payoff distributions (described as “options”), A and B.
The receiver then, without knowing the actual payoffs under each option, chooses between the two options.
Only the sender is informed about the payoff distribution under each option, and this information remains private
to her even after the game ends. 8 In addition, the sender is told that the receiver does not have any information
on the payoffs. Assume that × > m and n > y in Table 1.

Table 1
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A Generic Deception Game.
Option

Sender’s Payoff

Receiver’s Payoff

A

$x

$y

B

$m

$n

The game begins with the sender sending one of the two messages to the receiver, recommending the option that
results in a higher payoff to the receiver:
Message-A: “Option a will earn you (my receiver) more money than Option B”
Message-B: “Option b will earn you (my receiver) more money than Option A”.
The message is basically a “cheap-talk”, as it is costless and non-binding. Since

, Message-A is a lie. 9 After

receiving the message, the receiver ends the game by choosing one of the two options, which determines the
final payoffs to both players. The receiver only learns about the amount he has earned from the implemented
option, but not what he could have earned had he chosen the other option. As such, he can never determine
whether the received message is truthful or not.

Next, we assign two sets of values to the parameters (x, y, m and n) in order to vary the sender’s potential (net)
benefit from lying, given by (x-m). 10 We conducted our experiments in the United States and in India. (The
rationale for running experiments at a second location is discussed later.) Tables 2 shows the experimental
games, parameterized in local currencies (Dollar and Rupee).

Table 2
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Deception Games and Treatments.
US
Games

High
Benefit(HB)

Low
Benefit(LB)

India

Option

Sender’sPayoff

Receiver’sPayoff

Sender’sPayoff

Receiver’sPayoff

A

$19

$5

Rs 450

Rs 200

B

$5

$19

Rs 200

Rs 450

A

$12

$5

Rs 325

Rs 200

B

$5

$19

Rs 200

Rs 450

Control
Treatments

Interv
Treat

HB Control

HB-lo

LB Control

LB-hi

In Table 2, the first game is labeled as High Benefit (HB) in which the sender earns $19 (Rs 450) under OptionA, and only $5 (Rs 200) under Option-B. As such, the sender can potentially gain $14 (Rs 250) by lying. Such
lying, on the other hand, can potentially reduce the receiver’s payoff by $14 (Rs 250), from $19 (Rs 450) under
Option-B to $5 (Rs 200) under Option-A. In the second game in Table 2, labeled as Low Benefit (LB), the
sender’s potential (net) benefit from lying is reduced to $7 (Rs 125), however, the potential loss to the receiver is
the same as in HB. 11

3.2 Experimental treatments & hypotheses
Our main experimental goal is to study two questions that are mirror images of each other. First, suppose the
senders’ perceived norm of lying is intervened to be higher (than when norm is not intervened). If so, can such
an intervention thwart the desirable effect of a reduction in the benefit from lying? Second, suppose the senders’

perceived norm of lying is intervened to be lower (than when norm is not intervened). If so, can such an
intervention of norm mitigate the undesirable impact of an increase in the benefit from lying? To answer these
questions, we design four treatments, the two controls (without intervention of perceived norm) and the two
intervention treatments, as listed in Table 2.
We follow a simple two-step approach using a between-subjects design. First, we let two sets of subjects play the
HB and the LB games. These two games form our controls. We not only expect to see a higher proportion of lie
(i.e., ratio of the number of Message-A to the total number of the messages) in HB than in LB, but also expect
senders’ belief about the norm of lying among peers to be higher in HB than in LB. Only after confirming this
from elicited sender belief, we plan to proceed to the second step.

In the second step, we conduct the intervention treatments, labeled as LB-high_norm and HB-low_norm. In the
LB-high_norm (HB-low_norm) treatment, subjects play the LB (HB) game in which senders, before they make
their decision, are provided with two additional pieces of information from the HB Control (LB Control)
treatment: (i) the payoffs under the two options in the HB Control (LB Control) treatment, and (ii) the number
and corresponding percentage of senders who lied and those who told the truth in the HB Control (LB Control)
treatment. Note that the additional information is flipped: subjects participating in LB-high_norm are provided
information from HB Control; likewise, HB-low_norm participants are provided information from LB Control.
12

By providing these additional information, we expect to have changed senders’ perceived norm of lying.

Specifically, we expect that when senders in LB-high_norm (HB-low_norm) are informed of the proportion of
lie in HB Control (LB Control), their belief about the proportion of lying peers would be higher (lower) than that
in the absence of such intervention. Elicitation of sender belief helps us check if we are actually successful in
changing the senders’ perceived norm in the desired direction. The next section discusses the belief elicitation
process in detail.
If the intervention of perceived norm is potent enough to change lying decisions substantially, then we expect the
proportion of lie in LB-high_norm (HB-low_norm) to be higher (lower) than the same in LB Control (HB
Control). We summarize this conjecture in the following testable hypotheses.
Hypotheses:
(a) Effect of a change in monetary benefit: In comparison to HB Control, the proportion of lie is lower in LB
Control.
(b) Effect of an upward shift of perceived norm: In comparison to LB Control, the proportion of lie is higher in
LB-high_norm.
(c) Effect of a downward shift of perceived norm: In comparison to HB Control, the proportion of lie is lower in
HB-low_norm.
The extant literature offers support for the directionality of the hypotheses. Part (a) is based on Gneezy (2005)
which shows that the propensity to lie increases as the benefit from lying increases. Innes and Mitra (2013),
Lefebvre et al. (2015), and Abbink et al. (2018) study different issues, but they all show that a decision maker’s
perception of unethicality among others and his/her propensity to engage in an unethical act have a direct
relationship. These studies provide support for the directionality in parts (b) and (c) which are formed on basis
that, holding the benefit from lying constant, a sender’s propensity to lie changes with her perceived norm of
lying among peers. 13
We close our discussion of the hypotheses by showing that they imply that a shift in perceived norm can
counteract the effect of a change in benefit. Let

and

denote the proportion of lie in the two control

treatments which differ in the monetary benefit from lying. The difference between

and

thus captures

the effect of a reduction in the benefit from lying on the propensity to lie, and Part (a) of the hypotheses posits
that

. Now, suppose

and

are the proportions of lying in the two intervention treatments,

HB-low_norm and LB-high_norm, respectively. Then part (b) of the hypotheses asserts that
multiply both sides by

1 and add

. If we

to both sides of the above inequality, we obtain

. The right side of this inequality captures the effect of the reduction in benefit from
lying, as stated earlier. The left side, along with the effect of the same reduction in benefit, reflects the effect of
the intended upward shift of perceived norm in LB-high_norm. Since the left side is smaller than the right side,

part (b) of the hypotheses implies that an intervention to shift perceived norm of lying among peers upward can
counteract the reduction in benefit from lying. Similarly, we can show part that (c) of the hypotheses implies
. That is, an intervention to shift perceived norm of lying among peers downward can
mitigate the impact of an increment in benefit from lying.

3.3 Experimental procedures
All experimental sessions were conducted at the San Diego State University, US; and the Jadavpur University,
India, and undergraduate students were recruited to participate. 14 It is not our goal to compare between the
experimental results obtained from these two countries; instead, we are interested in assessing whether the
hypotheses hold true for different subject populations.
In each session, we recruited an even number of subjects who participated in one (and only one) of the
treatments for a single shot play of the relevant deception game. Half of them were randomly assigned the role of
the sender and the other half the role of the receiver. The two groups were seated in separate rooms and were
never at the same place at the same time. To assist the experimenter, two monitors, one for each room, were
recruited for each session. Each treatment in our experiment consisted of 3 to 4 sessions. The average group size
was 12 pairs of subjects. In total, we recruited 176 and 169 pairs of sender-receiver in the US and India,
respectively.
After a group arrived at the designated room, each subject was randomly assigned a registration number in a
double-blind protocol; the number remained anonymous to other subjects and also to the experimenter. The
registration numbers were used to randomly match a sender to a receiver. Each subject was then given a copy of
the instructions and, in addition, the experimenter read aloud the instructions. After all questions from the
subjects were answered in private, the experiment moved on to the decision-making stage.
Each sender was given a “message card” which had Message-A and Message-B printed on it; the sender simply
had to circle the message she wanted to send. Once the senders made their decisions, the cards were collected,
and the experimenter carried those to the receivers’ room. Each sender’s message card was then privately passed
on to her matched receiver. Upon seeing the message, each receiver chose between the two options on a piece of
paper, called the “decision card”. After the receivers made their decisions, the cards were collected and payments
were determined. After that, the receivers were paid privately, in cash. Finally, the experimenter moved back to
the senders’ room to conduct a small incentivized questionnaire. In the end, the senders were paid according to
the option the matched receiver chose, plus the amount they earned from the questionnaire. To maintain
anonymity, we placed subjects’ earnings in separate envelopes with registration numbers written on them and
laid them on a table. Subjects picked up their envelope on the way out.
To nullify any potential sender-belief that receivers may act strategically, senders were told (based on the results
from Gneezy, 2005) in the instructions that approximately 80% receivers in a similar experiment in the past had
chosen the option recommended by their respective sender, as in Innes and Mitra (2013). 15 The questionnaire
was designed to elicit sender belief about (i) peer behavior and (ii) receiver behavior. Each sender was asked to
predict the proportion of senders she believed lied in her session. The senders made their choice from a set of
five-percentage-point bandwidths: 0–5%, 6–10%, …, 96–100%. We paid each sender $1 (Rs 20) for marking a
choice that was either correct (i.e., matched with the actual percentage) or was within the two adjacent fivepercentage-point bandwidths, plus or minus, from the actual percentage.

The question on peer behavior was included in the questionnaire to help us measure senders’ perception about
the norm of lying in the treatment they participated in. It thus enables us to check whether: (a) such perception is
higher in HB Control than in LB Control, and (b) the intervention treatments are effective in swaying sender
perception in the intended direction, as discussed earlier. Each sender also indicated in the questionnaire her
belief on whether the matched receiver would accept the recommendation. Each sender was rewarded additional
$1 (Rs 20) for correct prediction. The question on receiver behavior was aimed at verifying whether the senders
believed the receivers would not act strategically, and therefore would follow the recommendation.
Senders and receivers never learned each other’s actual identity during or after the experiment. The receivers
were never told whether the matched sender was truthful. The monitors were specifically assigned the task of
promoting anonymity and preventing any form of communication among the subjects.
We now focus on the process of information transmission from the control treatments to the intervention
treatments. To pass on the information about the rate of lying from HB Control (LB Control) to the senders in
LB-high_norm (HB-low_norm) in a subtle manner and to minimize the possibility that the information is
suggestive of expected behavior, the experimental instructions in LB-high_norm (HB-low_norm) presented the
information as an illustrative example of the experimental procedure and the nature of the data the experiment
generated. As indicated before, the instructions in LB-high_norm (HB-low_norm) clearly and truthfully
indicated that: (i) the data came from actual sessions, (ii) the decision-making situations in those sessions were
similar but the payoffs were different, and (iii) the actual payoffs in HB Control (LB Control). As such, senders
in LB-high_norm (HB-low_norm) were given complete information on the payoffs and the summary statistics
of sender decisions in HB Control (LB Control).

4 Results
Our main interest is in whether the sender chooses Message-A (lie) or Message-B (truthful). Table 3 reports the
number of senders, the number of those who lied and the resulting proportion of lie for each treatment in the two
countries. The numbers for the India experiment are presented in parentheses. Combining all treatments, 70%
(65%) of the 176 (169) senders from the US (India) lied. Table 3 also reports summary statistics on two
additional variables constructed from data collected from the questionnaire

– Female, which is an indicator for

female senders, and Deaf-receiver, which is an indicator for senders who believed their respective receiver
would not follow recommendation.

Table 3
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Summary of Sender Composition, Decisions and Belief about Receiver Credulity.
Experimental
Treatments
HB Control
LB Control

Number of
Senders

Proportion of
Female

Number of Lying
Senders

Proportion of Lying
Senders

Proportion of Deafreceiver

45

0.31

35

78%

0.16

(45)

(0.49)

(33)

(73%)

(0.29)

47

0.45

27

57%

0.17

LB-high_norm

HB-low_norm

Total

(36)

(0.56)

(19)

(53%)

(0.17)

42

0.50

31

74%

0.17

(42)

(0.50)

(30)

(71%)

(0.19)

42

0.33

30

71%

0.24

(46)

(0.39)

(28)

(61%)

(0.22)

176

0.40

123

70%

0.18

(169)

(0.48)

(110)

(65%)

(0.22)

Note: The results from the India experiment are reported within parentheses. Female is a dummy variable that represents if
the decision-maker is a female. Deaf-receiver is a dummy variable for senders who believe their respective receiver would
not follow recommendation.

Below, we first discuss results from proportion tests and regression-based tests of our hypotheses. Then we
discuss elicited sender belief, with a view to developing insights into perceived norm of lying in the control
treatments and how the intervention treatments may have changed such perceived norm.

4.1 Hypotheses testing using proportion Tests:
We begin by examining part (a) of our hypotheses. Specifically, since lying is more beneficial in HB Control
than in LB Control, we expect the proportion of lie to be higher in the former than in the latter. 16 As Table 3
shows, the data supports part (a) of our hypotheses: 78% (73%) and 57% (53%) of the senders lied in HB
Control and LB Control, respectively. Table 4 shows the results of Z-tests for difference in proportion of lie
between pairs of treatments. The results reveal that the difference between HB Control and LB Control is
statistically significant.

Table 4
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Test for Treatment Differences in Proportion of Lying.
Experimental
Treatments

LB Control
57% (53%)

LB-high_norm
74% (71%)

Z = 2.15, p t = 0.032**,

Z = 0.44, p t = 0.662,

HB Control

p o = 0.016**

p o = 0.331

78% (73%)

(Z = 1.86, p t = 0.062*,

(Z = 0.21, p t = 0.836,

p o = 0.031**)

p o = 0.418)

LB-high_norm
74% (71%)

Z = 1.68, p t = 0.094*,
p o = 0.047**

–

(Z = 1.64, p t = 0.102, p o = 0.051*)

HB-low_norm
71% (61%)
Z = 0.75, p t = 0.454, p o = 0.227
(Z = 1.22, p t = 0.224,
p o = 0.112)

Z = 0.31, p t = 0.758, p o = 0.379
(Z = 0.99, p t = 0., p o = 0.162)
Z = –1.37, p t = 0.171,

LB Control
57% (53%)

–

Refer to the above row

p o = 0.086*

(Z = –0.73, p t = 0.467,
p o = 0.233)

Note: Results from the India experiment are reported within parentheses. Z-statistics are calculated for the difference in
proportions in row and column treatments in the above matrix. The results in italics and bold font correspond to our
hypotheses (a, b and c). p t is the two-tailed p -value (alternative hypothesis, H 1 : row ≠ column) and p o is the one-tailed p value (alternative hypothesis, H 1 : row > column). One-tailed test results are appropriate for all three of our hypotheses, since
they are directional (see Section 3 ). We report two-tailed p -values for them for completeness. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Next, we check whether senders are responsive to the intervention designed to shift perceived norm of lying
upward, while benefit from lying is held constant, as part (b) of our hypotheses predicts. Recall that senders
participating in LB-high_norm faced the same payoff consequences as in LB Control; however, they were
informed before they chose their message that 78% (73%) of prior senders lied. Per our experimental design, this
information was taken from HB Control. As in part (b) of the hypotheses, our expectation is that the intervention
would lead to a higher proportion of lie in LB-high_norm than in LB Control. We see a substantial impact of the
intervention

– the proportion of lie in LB-high_norm jumped to 74% (71%) from 57% (53%) observed in LB

Control; the difference is (marginally) significant, as Table 4 shows. As such, we fail to reject part (b).
Part (c) of the hypotheses focuses on whether, holding benefit from lying constant, an intervention to shift
perceived norm of lying downward leads to a decrease in the proportion of lie. Recall that HB Control and HBlow_norm have the same payoff consequences, while HB-low_norm implements the desired intervention by
informing the senders in HB-low_norm, before they made their decision, that 57% (53%) of prior senders lied
(as was observed in LB Control). Our expectation is that the proportion of lie would be lower in HB-low_norm
than in HB Control. Table 3 shows that the proportion of lie in HB-low_norm was 71% (61%), somewhat lower
than 78% (73%) we observed in HB Control. However, the difference is not statistically significant, as shown in
Table 4. As such, we reject part (c) of the hypotheses.

4.2 Hypotheses testing using regression models
We estimate Probit regression models to check for the treatment effects. The marginal effects are reported in
Table 5. The binary dependent variable is whether or not a sender lies, and the covariates include the treatment
dummies, Female and Deaf-receiver. The reported marginal effects indicate by how much the probability of
lying increases or decreases in a treatment, in comparison to LB Control, which serves as the base (omitted)
treatment. Our expectations are as follows: the marginal effect of HB Control to be positive and statistically
significant (part (a) of the hypotheses), the marginal effect of LB-high_norm to be positive and statistically
significant (part (b) of the hypotheses), and the marginal effect of HB-low_norm to be significantly lower than
that of HB Control (part (c) of the hypotheses).
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Marginal Effects from Probit Regression on Lying.

HB Control

US

India

Pooled

0.18** (0.08)

0.23** (0.09)

0.20*** (0.06)

LB-high_norm

0.15* (0.08)

0.19* (0.09)

0.16** (0.06)

HB-low_norm

0.13 (0.08)

0.10 (0.10)

0.11* (0.06)

Female

–0.06 (0.07)

0.03 (0.08)

–0.02 (0.05)

Deaf-receiver

–0.21** (0.10)

–0.32*** (0.09)

–0.26*** (0.07)

India

–

–

–0.05 (0.05)

Obs.

176

169

345

R2

0.05

0.07

0.06

Log likelihood

–102.28

–101.20

–204.37

Note: The dependent variable is sender message choice (lie = 1, truthful = 0). LB Control is the omitted/reference treatment.
Female is a dummy variable that represents female decision-makers. Deaf-receiver is a dummy variable for senders who
believe their respective receiver would not follow recommendation. India is a dummy variable that represents observations
from the India experiment. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.

As Table 5 shows, the marginal effects for HB Control and LB-high_norm are indeed positive and statistically
significant, but marginally so in the case of LB-high_norm. Using a Wald test, we fail to reject the null
hypothesis that the marginal effects of HB-low_norm and HB Control are the same against the alternative
hypothesis that the former is lower than the latter (p = 0.300 (p = 0.129) for the US (India) experiment and
p = 0.144 for the pooled data). As such, we again fail to find support for part (c) of the hypotheses. Overall, the
results from the regression models are very much similar to those from the proportion tests we reported earlier.

4.3 Perceived norm and the effect of intervention
Recall that we presumed senders’ perceived norm about peer lying to be different between the two control
treatments, and that the intervention treatments would change the perceived norm to lead to the treatment effects.
To test these premises, we utilize data on the elicited sender belief. In the analysis that follows, we sequentially
answer three questions: (i) Was belief about peer lying lower in LB Control than in HB Control to begin with,
and was the difference large enough so that there was actually a scope for our intervention treatments to change
belief in the intended direction? (ii) Was the intervention effective in changing sender belief in LB-high_norm
and HB-low_norm the way we intended? That is, was belief regarding peer lying significantly higher in LBhigh_norm than in LB Control, and lower in HB-low_norm than in HB Control? (iii) Were sender decisions
consistent with their belief? That is, did an increase in belief regarding peer lying increase lying?
Fig. 1 speaks to question (i). It describes average sender belief about the proportion of lying peers and the
corresponding actual proportion of lie, which we have already discussed. We observe that senders in LB Control
believed 66% (46%) of the peers lied, while the same for HB Control was 74% (55%); the difference between
LB Control and HB Control is statistically significant for both countries. 17 As such, it was indeed feasible to
carry out the intended interventions, i.e., to orient sender belief in LB-high_norm to a higher level, and that in
HB-low_norm to a lower level.
Fig. 1

Actual Proportion and Elicited Belief About Proportion of Lie, (US on the Upper Panel; India on the Lower Panel).

We now focus on the belief data for the two intervention treatments to answer question (ii). We find that
interventions were indeed effective. Our expectation was that senders in LB-high_norm (HB-low_norm) would
believe in a higher (lower) proportion of lie among peers than those in LB Control (HB Control). Fig. 1 is
consistent with this expectation. The senders in LB-high_norm believed 75% (60%) of the fellow senders would
lie, whereas the same proportion in LB Control was 66% (46%). The difference is statistically significant; even
though the significance level is marginal for the US data. 18 On the other hand, the senders in HB-low_norm
believed 64% (44%) of the peer senders would lie, whereas the same proportion in HB Control was 74% (55%).
Once again, the difference is statistically significant. 19
In order to answer questions (i) and (ii) using regressions, we ran Tobit regression models of individual sender
belief on treatment dummies. 20 Table 6 reports the results. As before, LB Control serves as the base (omitted)
treatment, and we expect to observe the marginal effects for HB Control and LB-high_norm to be statistically
significant and positive, and the marginal effect for HB-low_norm to be lower than the same for HB Control.
We find that compared to LB Control, belief is significantly higher (approximately 9%) in HB Control in both
countries (supporting (i)). We also observe that belief in LB-high_norm is significantly higher by a margin of
10% (13%) than in LB Control (supporting (ii)). In addition, belief is lower in HB-low_norm than in HB
Control (supporting (ii)). 21
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Marginal Effects from Tobit Regression on Sender Belief about Peer Lying.
US

India

HB Control

8.54* (4.69)

8.81* (4.63)

LB-high_norm

9.82** (4.72)

13.04*** (4.70)

HB-low_norm

–1.91 (4.73)

–3.59 (4.63)

Female

0.60 (3.69)

–4.91 (3.20)

Intercept

65.14*** (5.97)

44.12*** (3.73)

Obs.

176

169

R2

0.01

0.01

Log Likelihood

–795.52

–751.58

Note: Dependent variable: elicited sender belief about the proportion of lying peers. LB Control is the omitted/reference
treatment. Female is a dummy variable that represents if the decision-maker is a female. Standard errors are in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Next, we turn to question (iii). If we consider the belief data and the decision data together, as in Fig. 1, we see
that variations in decisions across treatments are consistent with the way sender belief varied across these
treatments. It shows that an increase in sender belief about peer lying is associated with an increase in lying. This
association helps us assert that the effects of interventions on the decisions to lie is due to the effectiveness of the
interventions in changing sender belief.
Finally, we present in Table 7 results from a few additional Probit regressions to examine the effect of sender
belief about peer lying on sender’s decision to lie. The binary dependent variable is whether or not a sender lies.
Regression model (1) only includes treatment variables

– whether the benefit from lying is low or high, and

whether the norm perception is intervened. The results for model (1) basically reproduce the findings on
treatment effects discussed earlier (Table 5). Our main interest is in model (2) of Table 7 which includes controls
for sender belief. We see that the inclusion of sender belief turns the marginal effect of the indicator variable for
intervention statistically insignificant. This observation enables us to assert with greater confidence that the
effects of perception intervention work via sender perception of the norm of peer lying. We also notice how
powerful sender belief about peer lying is in shaping decision: in Table 7, a 1% increase in belief leads to a 1%
increase in lying.
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Marginal Effects from Probit Regression on Lying: Effect of Belief and Treatment Variables.

US

India

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

Sender Belief

–

0.01*** (0.002)

–

0.01*** (0.002)

High Benefit (HB)

0.19** (0.09)

0.14 (0.10)

0.26** (0.11)

0.21* (0.11)

Intervention

0.16* (0.09)

0.07 (0.10)

0.20* (0.11)

0.07 (0.11)

–0.23 (0.15)

–0.04 (0.16)

–0.37** (0.15)

–0.15 (0.17)

Female

–0.06 (0.07)

–0.08 (0.08)

0.03 (0.08)

0.08 (0.08)

Deaf-receiver

–0.21** (0.10)

–0.11 (0.10)

–0.32*** (0.09)

–0.42*** (0.10)

Obs.

176

176

169

169

R2

0.05

0.23

0.07

0.23

Log likelihood

–102.28

–82.94

–101.20

–84.02

HB

× Intervention

Note: Dependent variable: sender message choice (lie = 1, truth = 0). LB Control is the omitted/reference treatment. Sender
Belief is a sender’s belief about the proportion of lying peers. High Benefit is a dummy for high benefit of lying. Intervention
is a dummy for the intervention treatments. Female is a dummy variable that represents if the decision-maker is a female.
Deaf-receiver is a dummy variable for senders who believed their respective receiver would not follow recommendation. The
difference between (1) and (2) is that the latter one includes Sender Belief. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Tables 6 and 7 together provide a complete picture of the two-step process: how provision of norm-related
information affects lying decision, via changes in perceived norm. Table 6 establishes the first step in which
information provision changes senders’ perceived norm of lying (measured by sender belief regarding peer
lying), and Table 7 demonstrates the second step in which changes in perceived norm change senders’
propensity to lie.

5 Discussion
In this section we address several issues related to our design and interpretation of our results. First, we would
like to test robustness of the results with a design based on “partial” information feedback. Recall that, in the
complete information version of the treatment LB-high_norm (HB-low_norm), senders were provided with
information on the proportion of lie and the payoffs in HB Control (LB Control). However, information
available to a decision maker in real life is often partial. An individual may develop a fairly good idea about the
overall level of (dis)honesty in the society by reading newspapers/reports, watching television etc. However,
he/she might not have complete knowledge about the magnitude of material benefit one can accrue by being
dishonest, because dishonest actions are clandestine and their magnitude varies, and estimates of gains and losses
due to dishonesty are questionable.
To address the issue discussed above, we conducted two more treatments: LB-partial and HB-partial. In LBpartial (HB-partial), we informed the senders about the proportion of lie and truth observed in HB Control (LB
Control), but we did not share any information about the payoffs in HB Control (LB Control). To reiterate, for
instance, senders participating in LB-partial (HB-partial) in the US experiment were informed that in a past
similar session 22% senders told the truth and 78% lied (43% senders told the truth and 57% lied). In specific
terms, we (the experimenters) categorically announced during the sessions that no additional information on

payoffs would be provided. Clearly, the design not only speaks to the issue of partial information in real life, but
it also ascertains that nothing else other than a norm related information is provided.
Table 8 reports the data from LB-partial and HB-partial treatments, along with the results of Z-tests for
difference in proportions. Recall that the proportion of lie in LB-high_norm was 74% (71%) in the US (India)
experiment. Though this proportion is slightly lower than the 78% (76%) level in LB-partial, the difference is
not statistically significant. The same proportion in HB-low_norm was 71% (61%), which is also not statistically
significantly different from the observed level of 68% (64%) in HB-partial. These results reinforce our finding
that information on prior decision-makers’ dishonesty is indeed a robust and powerful force in affecting
subsequent dishonest behavior, especially when it is suggestive of high dishonesty, and information on benefit
from dishonesty for those prior decision-makers does not affect behavior of later decision-makers in any
significant way. These findings also help justify the directional nature of parts (b) and (c) of the hypotheses.
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Results on Lying in Additional Treatments.
Z Tests Results
Treatments

Number
of
Senders

Number of
lying
Senders

Proportion of
Lying Senders

vs. LBhigh_norm
74% (71%)

vs. HBlow_norm
71% (61%)

vs. LB
Control
57%
(53%)

–

–

Belief
about
Lying
Proportion

Z = 0.44,
LB-partial

46

36

78%

p = 0.660

(46)

(35)

(76%)

(Z = 0.60,

73%
(60%)

p = 0.595)
Z = –0.30,
HB-partial

44

30

68%

(44)

(28)

(64%)

–

p = 0.763
(Z = 0.29,

–

68%
(49%)

p = 0.769)
Z = –0.19,
LB-example

42

23

55%

(36)

(20)

(56%)

–

–

p = 0.850

69%

(Z = 0.26,

(49%)

p = 0.798)
Note: The results from the India experiment are reported within parentheses. Z-statistics are calculated for the difference in
proportions in row and column treatments in the above matrix. All tests reported are two-tailed (alternative hypothesis, H 1 :
row ≠ column).

The second issue we address in this section deals with potential experimenter demand effect created by the
information transmission process in the intervention treatments (LB-high_norm and HB-low_norm).
Specifically, we are interested to check if the provided information on lying from prior sessions created an

“example” the senders might have thought they were expected to follow. To accomplish this goal, we ran an

additional treatment labeled as LB-example. This treatment is identical to LB-partial in every respect with only
one exception: though information on past senders’ lying was given in the instructions to the senders in LBexample, they were not told explicitly that this information came from actual past sessions; instead, they were
told that the purpose of the information was just to give them an example on how the outcomes of a session may
look like. If an example could create experimenter demand effects in our intervention treatments, then that should
also be true for LB-example as well, and by extension, the proportion of lie would be higher in LB-example
than in LB Control. 22
As Table 8 shows, only 55% (56%) of the senders in LB-example chose to lie and this proportion is statistically
identical to that in LB Control. As such, we observe that a mere example does not affect senders’ preferences for
lying

– it only matters when the example is suggestive of a norm of actual behavior (as in LB-high_norm and

HB-low_norm). 23 Therefore, we gather that the treatment effects we observed did not originate from any
experimenter demand effect, but they were results of the ‘norm’ conveyed by the transmitted information in the
intervention treatments.
The third issue we focus on in this section is another confounding factor which may have impacted our results.
One may contend that the difference observed in propensity to lie between LB Control (HB Control) and LBhigh_norm (HB-low_norm) is due to changes in senders’ selfishness. We do not test for this conjecture; instead,
we rely on the findings in Innes and Mitra (2013). They tested this conjecture and found that intervention on
dishonesty norm changed preferences for lying in a deception game, but not selfishness in a control dictator
game (see Table 3 in Innes & Mitra, 2013). We, therefore, rule out changes in selfishness as a possible
explanation of our treatment differences.
We bring this section to an end by recognizing a limitation of the type of substitutability (between benefit from
lying and perceived norm of lying) we proposed and observed in the data. Our argument holds when the change
in benefit is moderate. Of course, senders’ lying behavior is likely to show substantial responsiveness when the
benefit from lying changes a lot (e.g. a lowering of the payoff from lying that makes lying almost equivalent to
telling the truth in terms of the payoff). In that case, intervention of perceived norm is unlikely to counteract the
effects of the change in benefit. We also acknowledge that our experiment does not establish the rate of
substitution between benefit from lying and perceived norm of lying; our results only establish the possibility of
the substitution.

6 Summary
We started off with a clear objective of focusing on the impact of pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives on
human behavior. Specifically, our interest was to test if changes in the perception of a descriptive norm of lying
could counteract the opposing impact of changes in the pecuniary benefit from lying. We designed experimental
treatments where these two motives were carefully calibrated to operate in opposite directions and found partial
evidence that the non-pecuniary motive could counteract its pecuniary counterpart. Subsequent treatments further
established this result by removing possible confounding factors.
Our findings provide an indirect explanation for a critical empirical trend emerging across the globe. Majority of
the people worldwide believe corruption in their country is getting worse (page 3, Global Corruption Barometer,
2013, Transparency International). 24 A plethora of factors determine why countries remain entangled in
corruption/dishonesty. We trace out a fundamental behavioral reason for the intransigency of dishonesty:
individuals are guided by the prevailing social norm, only if it is in consonance with their “homo economicus”
attitude. Given that societal norms do not change overnight, future work may focus on developing mechanisms

with a view to eradicating dishonesty gradually. It is important to underscore that any attempt to improving the
stringency of anticorruption laws should be carefully calibrated with the fact that the process of change in norms
related to dishonesty is rather sluggish.
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Footnotes

Text Footnotes
[2] A large literature on conformity to norms which establishes that norm can induce behavior (
Allcott, 2011; Alpízar and Martinsson, 2010; Bardsley & Sausgruber, 2005; Becker, 1996;
Bernheim, 1994; Biccheiri, 2006; Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004;
Carlsson, García, & Löfgren, 2010; Carpenter, 2004; Cason & Mui, 1998; Egebark and
Ekström, 2011; Ferraro, Miranda, & Price, 2011; Ferraro & Price, 2013; Festinger, 1954;
Fischer & Huddart, 2008; Frey & Meier, 2004; Goeree & Yariv, 2015; Goldstein, Cialdini, &
Griskevicius, 2008; Innes & Mitra, 2013; Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008; Krupka & Weber,
2008; Shang & Croson, 2009; Velez, Stranlund, & Murphy, 2009; Zafar, 2011).
[3] In specific terms, our research is based on the concept of descriptive norm, which represents the
standards that originate from others’ actual behavior. See Cialdini and Trost (1998) for a
discussion on the classification of social norms.
[4] We notice a stylized fact in a proprietary dataset maintained by the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG), which publishes country-level data on political, economic, financial, and

composite risk ratings. (i) In a sample of 124 countries for which data is consistently available,
the average law and order (LO) score has improved from 3.02 (out of a maximum of 6) in 1990
to 3.64 in 2010. (ii) For these 124 countries, the average corruption score (inverse measure:
higher is better) has declined from 3.33 (out of a maximum of 6) in 1990 to 2.73 in 2010. (iii)
For the set of 75 countries that (had weak LO situation and) were placed in the lower half (<=
3) of the possible score range in 1990, the average LO score has markedly improved from 1.91
in 1990 to 3.11 in 2010. (iv) For these 75 countries with marked LO improvement between
1990 and 2010, the corresponding average corruption score has worsened from 2.66 to 2.19. (v)
Narrowing down further, for the 40 most corrupt countries, the average corruption score has
gone down even though the average LO score has improved over the same time-range.
Admittedly, these numbers are coarse, and they raise many complex questions on cause and
effect. However, since the size of the sample is large, the general trend discussed above cannot
be ignored. (The summary statistics and the description of the indexes are available from the
authors.)
[5] Strictly speaking, we are not suggesting that dishonesty and corruption are the same
phenomenon. However, by and large, the literature on corruption/dishonesty interchangeably
uses these two terms. See Bardhan (1997) for an excellent discussion on this topic.
[6] We are thankful to an associate editor and two reviewers for drawing our attention to some of
these works.
[7] Rosenbaum, Billinger, and Stieglitz (2014) provide a detailed survey of the literature on
lying/dishonesty.
[8] For expositional purposes, we shall consider the sender (receiver) as female (male) throughout
the paper.
[9] To remain neutral with labeling, we varied the option labels (A or B) across senders in the
experiment. For some senders, Message-A was truthful, and for the others, Message-B. For
expositional simplicity, however, we will assume throughout the paper that Message-A is the lie.
[10] Gneezy (2005) shows that senders’ propensity to lie in the deception game increases with
benefit from lying (= x

– m) and decreases with the potential cost imposed on the receiver (= n

– y). Using a dictator control treatment, he also shows that decision-making in the deception
game is not the same as in the dictator game, as there is a psychological cost to lying in the
deception game.
[11] We tried to remain consistent between the US payoffs and the Indian payoffs. While deciding
on the Indian payoffs, we used three different criteria, which were: (i) the purchasing power
parity (PPP) factor between US Dollar and Indian Rupee ($1 ≈ Rs17) (http://data.worldbank.or
g/indicator/PA.NUS.PPP), (ii) a minimum expected payoff of Rs 200 for each participant, and
(iii) conversion of the resulting number from (i) and (ii) into the nearest focal number. For
instance, $5 ($19) would be equivalent to Rs 85 (Rs 323) in PPP terms. To ensure a minimum
expected payoff of Rs 200, an amount of Rs 115 was added to make the payoffs Rs 200 (Rs
438). Finally, we converted Rs 438 into the nearest focal number of Rs 450. The same
procedure was adopted to determine the payoff of Rs 325 under LB.

[12] One can also think about two more treatments in which the LB (HB) game is played and the
subjects are provided information on payoffs and lying behavior from an earlier LB (HB)
treatment. In other words, in these two treatments participants playing the LB game would be
exposed to prior-session information involving a low level of lying (from past LB Control
sessions), and likewise for the HB game. We did not conduct these treatments because, as we
would see in the Results section, that the actual level of lying in the LB (HB) treatment was not
much different from the (un-intervened) belief about the propensity to lie in this treatment. As a
result, there would not be much room for any intervention regarding belief. Also, for instance, if
the intensity of lying in LB-high_norm was significantly higher than the same in LB, then a
putative “HB-high_norm ” treatment would likely result in an even greater lying intensity than
the same in the HB treatment. It is important to understand that such a research question is not
particularly interesting, because it is tantamount to asking how people would behave in a culture
of high dishonesty in which the benefit from dishonesty is also high. As such, we have not
designed treatments like “HB-high_norm ” and “LB-low_norm ”.
[13] Recall that the senders in the intervention treatments are provided with two pieces of
information from prior sessions

– (i) payoff from lying and (ii) level and proportion of lying.

When determining the directionality in parts (b) and (c) of our hypotheses based on the extant
literature, we make an implicit assumption that the information on others’ payoffs does not
produce any confounding effect. In other words, the expected effect on lying in the intervention
treatments is produced by part (ii) of the information. As we mentioned in Section I, we conduct
partial information treatments which provide a direct test of this assumption and find support for
it. These treatments are discussed in detail in the Discussion section.
[14] According to Hugh-Jones (2016), the US and India differ in terms of honesty. He finds that
beliefs about honesty are not correlated with reality in either country.
[15] Indeed, approximately 82% of the receivers in our experiment followed the matched sender’s
recommendation.
[16] Since our experiment implemented a between-subjects design, a given subject was not exposed
to more than one treatment condition. As a result, we do not need to follow any particular order
to compare the data. For instance, if

, then

propensity due to an increase in benefit, while

measures the increase in lying
describes the decrease in lying

propensity due to a decrease in benefit. However, we do not know or make any attempt to
predict how these comparisons would look like in a within-subjects design, in which subjects
participate in multiple treatments in different order. That is, we do not know whether
and

, where the superscript denotes the order in which subjects participate in the

treatments, would be the same.
[17] In a one-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the difference in mean, we observe p = 0.034 (p =
0.015).
[18] In a one-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the difference in mean between the beliefs in LBhigh_norm and LB Control, we observe p = 0.084 (p = 0.003).
[19]

